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Abstract
We conduct experiments in urban slums to measure trust and cooperation and to see how behavior
varies with demographic factors and associational measures of social capital. Overall, we ﬁnd high
contribution rates among Thai and Vietnamese participants in a voluntary contribution game, and we
see that many participants are willing to signal their disapproval of free riding despite it being costly
to do so. At the individual level, we ﬁnd that behavior varies with many demographic factors and
with many associational factors. However, these correlations often differ signiﬁcantly between our
two locations, indicating the role of culture, deﬁned broadly.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: C91; C92; H41; I32
Keywords: Cooperation; Trust; Social disapproval; Thailand; Vietnam
1. Introduction
A current trend in the economic development literature is to identify and understand
how social aspects of individual and community behavior contribute to (or detract from)
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economic performance.1 Much of this literature has been grouped under a poorly deﬁned
term: social capital. The term is poorly deﬁned because, to one set of researchers, social
capital is deﬁned as the propensities of individuals to trust, cooperate, and punish other
individuals who act to establish and maintain prosocial norms of behavior (e.g., Fukuyama,
1995; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2002). At the same time, however, to other
researchers social capital means the community level networks among individuals that lead
to efﬁcient outcomes when contracts are hard to enforce (e.g., Putnam, 2000). Despite
an outpouring of research using both of these deﬁnitions of social capital, there remains
signiﬁcant conceptual confusion regarding the aspects of communities and individuals that
demonstratesocialcapital.Tobemorespeciﬁc,wethinkoftheﬁrstdeﬁnitionasbehavioral
socialcapitalandthesecondasassociationalsocialcapital.Oneofourpurposesistosearch
for links between these two concepts.
As if conceptual problems were not enough to overcome, social capital research is also
confounded by measurement and estimation issues (Durlauf, 2002). Speciﬁcally, different
deﬁnitions of social capital lead to different strategies for measuring its effects. At the
individual level, researchers look for behavioral measures of trust, trustworthiness, and
cooperation, all in the (implied) context of social dilemmas where individual incentives are
atoddswithcollectiveefﬁciency.Thesemeasurestypicallycomefromsurveyedself-reports
of behavior and attitudes. A representative question from the general social survey (GSS)
is “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?” Research that focuses on the associational deﬁnition of
socialcapital,whilealsotypicallybasedonself-reportsfromsurveys,askslesshypothetical
andmorefactualquestions,suchas“Howmanyvolunteerorganizationsdoyoubelongto?”
It is not news that surveys are an imperfect way to gather information about individual
behavior, but their practical advantages (i.e., they are comparatively cheap to conduct and
often provide a large sample) continue to make them popular research tools. The beneﬁts
of surveys, however, may be outweighed in the case of behavioral social capital. While
there surely exists measurement error in the more factual network questions, if for no other
reason than because respondents are careless, hypothetical questions about behavior add
other biases that may be more worrisome because they tend to be systematic. As just one
example, who wants to think of him or herself as untrustworthy?2
Our second purpose is to report on an attempt to measure behavioral social capital in
the ﬁeld using experiments instead of surveys. We hypothesize that experiments provide
more accurate measures of behavioral social capital because paying participants based
on their choices provides an incentive to take the exercise seriously (especially when the
stakes are high) and because participants must risk money to trust or cooperate. That is,
providing incentives for our participants should reduce much of the “noise” associated with
hypothetical survey measures of prosocial behavior.
Our study is unique for four reasons. First, while much of the work on social capital is
focused on residents of the industrialized west, our participants are from Southeast Asia.
1 Examples include Desdoigts (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Woolcock (1995). The near exponential
growth of such research is documented in Isham et al. (2002).
2 See Carpenter (2002a) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) for an expanded discussion of the difﬁculties
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Second, instead of using students, our participants live and work in urban slums. Specif-
ically, our research brought us to ﬁve communities in Bangkok and ﬁve communities in
Ho Chi Minh City. We ﬁnd these populations particularly interesting because people in the
developing world often face social dilemmas on a daily basis and therefore may behave
differently in situations that require trust or cooperation than students in the industrial-
ized west. With this fact in mind, our results should be more directly relevant for studies of
povertyanddevelopment.3 Third,insteadofusingthepopularBergetal.(1995)investment
gametomeasuretrustandcooperation(asinAshrafetal.,2003;CrosonandBuchan,1999;
Carter and Castillo, 2002), we employ a voluntary contribution experiment (like G¨ achter
et al., 2003) in which cooperative acts measure the degree to which participants trust that
other participants will also cooperate. Fourth, because we also gathered associational data
in a post-experiment interview, we examine the links between associations and behavior.
2. Background and community descriptions
Our primary interest in slum dwellers, the cities of Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh, and this
region in general, is that the area is experiencing rapid growth and urbanization while a
signiﬁcant portion of the population is increasingly marginalized. The resulting increase
in inequality, speciﬁcally, is the source of serious concern for policy makers in the region
(Fritzen, 2002; Kakwani and Krongkaew, 2000). Many marginalized households end up
in urban slums where economic opportunities are scarce and health and environmental
problems are abundant. We are interested in the determinants of trust and cooperation
under these circumstances for policy reasons because, increasingly, policy in developing
countries presumes some predisposition to cooperate on the part of the poor.
Southeast Asia is a region composed of several economic tigers surrounded by a few
countries where little has changed or improved in the past half century (e.g., Cambodia,
Laos and Myanmar/Burma).4 Thailand and Vietnam, however, represent relative success
stories in this rapidly industrializing part of the developing world although their paths to
success could not, at least until recently, have been more different. Aside from the basic
similaritiesofreligion,sizeofpopulation,geographicendowments,andsoon.,thepolitical
economy of the two nations differ in many, if not all, respects.
Thailand,andspeciﬁcallyBangkok,hasadoptedagenerallylaissezfaireapproachtoeco-
nomic development in the last 30 years. As such, the government of Thailand has permitted
and, some argue, even encouraged the extreme concentration of industrial, manufacturing,
commercial and service sectors within the Bangkok Metropolitan Region. While several
steps have been taken since the early 1990s to support the deconcentration of economic ac-
tivities to smaller cities within 100 or so miles of Bangkok, these efforts have had relatively
little effect on Bangkok’s rate of growth.
3 For evidence supporting this view see Henrich et al. (2001) who show that the variance in behavior in a
simple bargaining experiment conducted in the ﬁeld in ﬁfteen small-scale societies can be explained by the extent
to which cooperation is needed in local production.
4 There is increasing debate regarding the actual level of success of so-called tiger economies of Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia given the relatively limited growth these countries are still experiencing 6 years after the
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Bangkok has expanded exponentially since the end of the Vietnam War era and now
encompasses about 12 million people (out of a total population of 64 million). The land
mass occupied by these residents and their places of employment extends far beyond the
traditional city core and into vast suburban and even rural landscapes. The city itself is
extremely dense, congested and dirty, although Bangkok’s Metropolitan Authority (the
municipal government) has attempted, with the support of the central government, to ease
trafﬁc, improve sanitation, and deliver cleaner water. The lack of an effective means of
enforcement of environmental and economic regulations, however, as well as a reluc-
tance on the part of the Thai government to invest in physical and social infrastructure,
has contributed to the relatively unfortunate situation of hundreds of thousands of slum
dwellers.
Recent media accounts indicate a growing public dissatisfaction with environmental
conditions, expressed through public protests focused on air and water pollution. Local
mobilization (such as urban squatter associations, loosely organized through NGOs and/or
community groups) can, in speciﬁc circumstances particularly with the assistance of well-
placed contacts in the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority or one of the national level min-
istries, achieve substantial improvements in local quality of life. Squatter settlements have
obtained piped water connections, structural upgrades or day care centers as well as im-
proved land tenure arrangements through local organization and lobbying of key bureau-
crats. Thus, social capital within communities could potentially be of great value to slum
dwellers in terms of the potential of networks and trust to encourage economic and com-
munity development (Daniere et al., 2002).
Vietnam, however, is very different. The political economy of Vietnam has transformed
since 1986 and the introduction of doi moi (meaning renovation but actually describing
the liberalization process). The center of economic growth in Vietnam is Ho Chi Minh
City. Although slightly more than one-third the size of Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City has
experienced extremely rapid expansion, leading to its characterization as the world’s next
“Bangkok” (Drakakis-Smith and Dixon, 1997). There has been widespread expansion in
the urban area, and many additional households have moved to the city to be closer to
opportunities even without the paperwork required to dwell legally inside the metropolis.
WhiletheVietnamesecommunistpartytoleratesneitheranypublicadvocacyofideolog-
ical or political pluralism nor any citizen’s criticism of its foreign policies, the relationship
between the state and society in Vietnam is considerably more dynamic and changing more
rapidly than is generally perceived. In particular, non-registered locally based voluntary
associations have sprung up all over the country in the last 15 years. They include same-
village or same-province associations in the large cities, alumni, same-military-service,
rotating credit associations, and so on. While none of these new associations are political
in their orientation, the ties formed through them have been mobilized for collective action
and for a concerted voice for better local governance (Luong, 2003). As such, commu-
nity groups and ward-level People’s Committees are beginning to have a say in how local
government spending is allocated within their boundaries. Hence, social capital and the
ability to organize and work together to initiate local change is very much part of the urban
landscape in Vietnam.
While there are many differences in the institutions, economics, and cultures between
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will likely continue to depend on doi moi to help jump start its economy, and both Thailand
and Vietnam are increasingly exposed to foreign investment and the consumer culture of
the West apparent in most globalizing cities (Kim et al., 1997). Consequently, both national
and urban governments will look for new and cost-effective strategies to sustain economic
growth. Community participation and the role played by social capital remain key factors
believed by international donor agencies, NGOs, and government agencies to be vital to the
potential success of urban development and environmental policies.
To measure the level of social capital and trust in poor urban communities of Bangkok
and Ho Chi Minh City, we conducted experimental games and a post experiment survey in
ﬁve low-income communities in each city.5
In Bangkok, the communities were selected through the use of a sampling frame devel-
oped from a study of Bangkok slums (Setchell, 1992) and the local expertise of the project
team and their contacts. The communities were not selected randomly but are generally
representative of the broad range of slums and squatter areas in terms of size, history, loca-
tion and environmental conditions that one might see in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region.
The selection criteria included low average per capita or household income and disparate
locations to ensure that there would be some variation in terms of access to services (see
Daniere et al., 2002). We contacted the neighborhood organization or community leaders in
each of the neighborhoods to request permission to work with the community. Each of the
ﬁvecommunitiesweapproachedagreedtoworkwithus.Inthecaseofexperimentalgames,
potential participants were informed through leaﬂets and community announcements. Par-
ticipants were asked to meet at a central location, generally the local community center or
day care, if they wanted to volunteer for the games. The players were randomly selected
from among the volunteers gathered at the site.
To select communities in Ho Chi Minh City, we needed to rely to a greater degree on
local knowledge and connections. The slum communities could not be selected from a
sampling frame but were instead proposed by the People’s Committees responsible for
speciﬁc city districts. We approached ﬁve different districts and asked them to nomi-
nate one or two of their most impoverished wards or communities for inclusion in the
project. Since the research project has the support of the Vietnamese government and one
of our project team members is a government employee at the Institute for Social Sci-
ences, we were able to conduct our research relatively free of control or interference. It
is possible, of course, that we were directed to showpiece communities although given
our extensive travels throughout the city, this seems unlikely to us and to our Vietnamese
colleagues.
The experiments in Ho Chi Minh City were more complex to organize than in Bangkok.
We chose to conduct the games in meeting rooms at the Institute for Social Sciences to
minimize neighborhood disruption and monitoring by party (People’s Committee) ofﬁ-
cials. Participants from the different communities who volunteered for the experiment were
transported by van or taxi to the center, played the game, and were then provided trans-
portation back to their communities. As in Bangkok, potential participants were informed
that the game would result in immediate earnings; there was no lack of volunteers.
5 The names, locations and brief descriptions of the different communities can be found together with the
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3. Our experimental protocol
Our ﬁeld experiments were conducted during the summer of 2002 and consisted of a
hand-runversionofthevoluntarycontributionmechanisminwhichplayerswereorganized
into groups and individually decided how much to contribute to a public good.
For us, trust is the willingness to abandon strategic deliberation (in particular subgame
perfection), making one vulnerable to others, in the belief that one will be better off as a
result.Withthisdeﬁnitioninmind,anumberofexperimentalgamesmaybeusedtomeasure
trust.Asmentionedabove,apopularexperimentistheBergetal.investmentgameinwhich
a ﬁrst mover sends money through the experimenter to a second mover. Any money that
is sent is multiplied by a factor greater than one so that sending is socially efﬁcient. The
second mover can then send any fraction of the amount she receives back to the ﬁrst mover.
In this context, the amount sent by the ﬁrst mover is thought to measure trust. There are
also a number of discrete choice games with incentives that are similar to the investment
game (e.g., McCabe et al., 1996; G¨ uth et al., 1997).
Inpsychology,therehasbeenatraditionofassociatingtrustwithbeingcooperativeinthe
prisoner’s dilemma (see Deutsch, 1973) and this area of research has, more recently, been
exploredbyeconomistsandpoliticalscientists(e.g.,Ahnetal.,2003).Indeed,experimental
studies have established a link between trust and cooperative acts in two-person prisoner’s
dilemma games (Messick et al., 1983; Parks and Hulbert, 1995). Based on this research, we
chose to study trust by implementing the voluntary contribution game as the four-person
generalization of the prisoner’s dilemma.
We gathered data from 240 participants (120 from each city). Our 240 participants were
split into 60 four-person groups, and the composition of the groups remained the same for
the entire experiment. This is known as the partners protocol. There were six groups from
each of the 10 communities. Our procedures are interesting from an experimental point of
view because, unlike most other experiments, we controlled for the gender composition of
our groups. In each community, we formed two all male groups, two all female groups, and
two half male half female groups.
The experiment typically lasted less than 2 hours including instructions, payment, and
an exit survey. We were concerned about the size of the potential earnings, so we calibrated
the payoffs at the social optimum to be between one-half and slightly more than one week’s
wage (based on local industrial wages that were approximately US$ 44 in Thailand and
US$ 12 in Vietnam). In practice, our Thai players earned US$ 21.62 and our Vietnamese
players earned US$ 12.42, on average.
The experiment consisted of two treatments and a total of 10 rounds. In the ﬁrst ﬁve
rounds, participants played a standard voluntary contribution game, and in the second ﬁve
rounds, the game was modiﬁed to allow players to socially sanction (i.e., show their disap-
provalof)freeriders.Thisgameisinterestingbecauseitallowsustoassesscooperationand
trust by the levels of contribution, but the game also allows us to assess players’ willingness
to express their dissatisfaction with the contributions of others.
The details of our experimental procedures are as follows. Before we began the experi-
ment, the instructions and game materials were translated into the local language, then the
back translations were discussed to iron out any contextual problems. During the experi-
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control for experimenter effects.6 The instructions contained a few examples that partici-
pantscouldaskquestionsabouttoassurethattheyunderstoodthegame.Duringtheﬁrstﬁve
rounds each player was endowed with 10 monetary units: ten 1000 Dong bills in Vietnam
or ten 5 Bhat coins in Thailand.7 One at a time, each member of a group walked behind a
blindsetuptomakedecisionsasanonymousaspossible.Oncebehindtheblind,eachgroup
member contributed as much of her 10-unit endowment as she wanted to a “group project.”
Each player then placed the rest of her endowment in an opaque, color-coded envelope and
returned to her seat.
Once all the group members made their contributions, one of the experimenters wrote
each of the four contributions on a slip of paper in random order (to keep them anonymous)
and calculated the sum. One at a time, the players then returned behind the blind to see how
much had been contributed individually and collectively to the group project. At this point
each person in the group received her payoff from the group project, which was an equal
share of the doubled sum of the group contributions. Each person put her share of the group
project in her envelope and then returned to her seat. This process was repeated ﬁve times.
Our procedures create a social dilemma for the subjects because each has a material
incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. The per period payoff to player i who
contributes xi is








10 they receive if everyone uses the dominant strategy. Hence, xi is a behavioral measure






each player was asked whether or not she wanted to have a picture displayed that meant
she was unhappy with what the others had contributed. The picture was meant to be easy
to interpret. We chose an unhappy face.
Itwascostlytohavethepicturedisplayedsothat,likecontributing,showingdisapproval
was dominated by remaining silent. It cost 200 Dong in Vietnam and 1 Bhat in Thailand to
display a picture. Any purchased pictures were displayed at the beginning of the next round
so that the sources of the pictures were anonymous. This procedure means that players saw
between zero and four pictures when they made their next contribution decisions.
6 Anchana Na-Ranong in Bangkok and Van Thi Ngoc Lan in Ho Chi Minh City.
7 At the time of the experiment the Dollar–Dong exchange rate was approximately US$ 1 = 15,000 VND and
the Dollar–Bhat exchange rate was approximately US$1=4 0Bhat.
8 The players did not know that the rules would change until after round 5 was completed. We did this to
prevent any confounds associated with players anticipating the rule change.540 J.P. Carpenter et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 55 (2004) 533–551
Table 1
Demographics, social capital indices, and experimental behavior
Bangkok Ho Chi Minh City
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D.
Demographics
Participant sex (1 = male) 120 0.50 0.50 120 0.50 0.50
Participant years of schooling 120 6.92 1.14 120 9.67 3.42
Participant age 120 40.98 13.71 120 35.10 13.69
Household size 119 4.97 2.43 120 5.43 2.44
Years of slum residence 119 18.24 13.20 118 21.82 13.73
Cooperation scale (6 (high) to −6 (low)) 120 2.80 0.56 120 2.34 0.47
Associational social capital
Own home (1 = yes) 120 0.76 0.43 120 0.92 0.28
Community homogeneity (1 = high) 118 0.21 0.41 102 0.05 0.22
Participate in community project (1 = yes) 116 0.92 0.27 114 0.93 0.26
Chat (likert scale 1 (low) to 4 (high)) 119 3.36 0.72 120 3.81 0.51
Describe (likert scale 1 (low) to 3 (high)) 119 3.44 0.50 120 3.46 0.53
Leader of community (1 = yes) 120 0.17 0.37 120 0.07 0.25
Experimental behavior
Average cooperation in the experiment 120 6.72 2.41 120 7.41 2.10
Fraction of individuals who disapprove 120 0.34 0.47 120 0.25 0.43
Because it was costly to sanction the other players in one’s group, individuals could
always do better by free riding on the sanctioning done by others. By backward induction,
knowing that sanctioning is dominated, free riders should not fear sanctions, so the only
subgame perfect equilibrium of this ﬁnitely repeated game is to continue to free ride.9
Despite the subgame perfect prediction, if players do sanction, it is a behavioral measure
of their willingness to incur a cost to express their disapproval of others.
4. Data overview
Table 1 summarizes three aspects of our participants: their demographics, their associa-
tional social capital, and their behavior in our experiment. By design, our participants were
half men and half women. On average, our Thai participants had ﬁnished grade school,
and our Vietnamese participants had completed junior high school. This difference in ed-
ucational attainment is signiﬁcant (t = 8.36, p < 0.01). Our participants are much older
than the standard student population, and our Thai participants are signiﬁcantly older than
our Vietnamese participants (t = 3.32, p < 0.01). In both locations our participants come
from households with around ﬁve members. Our Thai participants had spent an average of
18.24 years in their slum community, and our Vietnamese participants had lived in their
communities for 21.82 years, on average. These last statistics imply that our participants
had spent approximately half their lives in the slums.
9 Alternatively, notice that since sanctions impose no material harm on free riders, they should be ignored by
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The last demographic statistic we will consider was formulated from three questions
taken from two standard psychological scales used to measure cooperative predispositions,
the AB5C: II+/I− and the NEO: A4.10 We included the cooperation scale to account for
possible selection problems driven by cooperative personalities that might be distributed
non-randomly. As it turns out, the Thais seem to have been more cooperatively predis-
posed (t = 4.50, p < 0.01). Because we needed to keep the post-experiment survey brief,
the scale consisted of adding the following three items that seemed most relevant for our
current purposes (‘+’ means the item was scored positively for agreeing and ‘−’ means the
opposite)11
1. It is better to cooperate than compete. (+1)
2. People should listen to their conscience when making decisions. (+1)
3. It is amusing to play tricks on other people. (−1)
In our post-experiment interview, we gathered data on our participants’ associational
social capital. The existing evidence suggests that home ownership provides people an
anchor in the community they would not otherwise have (Sampson et al., 1997; Glaeser
and Sacerdote, 1999). Own home is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for people
who own their homes. Reported home ownership is signiﬁcantly higher in Vietnam (t =
3.42, p < 0.01). We expected people who own their own homes would be more vested in
the community and therefore more cooperative and more likely to show their disapproval
of free riding. We expected that people from more homogeneous communities will be more
cooperative with and more likely to punish other members of their “ingroup” (Messick
and Mackie, 1989; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2002). Community homogeneity measures the
respondent’s perception of the regional composition of her community. Speciﬁcally, this
question asked, “when new people come to your community, do they mostly come from the
samevillageorregionordotheycomefrommanydifferentplaces?”Regionalhomogeneity
is perceived by participants to be particularly low in Vietnam and the inter-city difference
is signiﬁcant (t = 3.53, p < 0.01).
Manyofourparticipantsorganizeprojectseachyeartocleanuporimprovetheconditions
in their communities. Participation in these projects is voluntary; therefore people have the
incentive to free ride. Participate in community project equals one if the respondent or
someone in the respondent’s family participated in the project. According to respondents
in both countries participation in these projects is very close to 100 percent, which is
inconsistent with information from casual conversations with community leaders. This
inconsistency illustrates the problem with surveyed self-reports.
Chat is a likert scale response to the question: “How often do you chat or spend time
togetherwithotherpeopleinyourcommunity?”Describe,alsomeasuredonalikertscale,is
the response to the question: “How do you describe your neighbors who are not relatives?”
The responses to this question varied between (1) like strangers to (3) like family. Finally,
10 Each of these two psychological scales have high Cornbach alpha values (0.73 for both) that measure the
extenttowhichthescalescaptureasingleunidimensionallatentconstruct,cooperativenessinthiscase.Thescales
are available on line at http://ipip.ori.org.
11 While the reported Cornbach interitem correlation is high for each of the original scales, it is considerable
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wewerealsoabletoidentifypeoplewhowerepoliticallyactiveinthecommunities.Leader
of community is a dummy which takes the value of one for anyone whom our collaborators
identiﬁed as a community leader (e.g., ward leaders in Vietnam). We see that we recruited
more leaders in Thailand (t = 2.45, p < 0.02), the Vietnamese were more connected to their
neighbors, on average (t = 5.58, p < 0.01), and both groups described their neighbors as
being mostly like family.
Intermsofsummarystatistics,bothgroupsofparticipantscontributedatveryhighlevels
in our experiment. Our Thai participants’ average contribution, pooling all 10 rounds, was
6.72 of their 10 coin endowment, and the Vietnamese contributed even more, 7.41 of their
10 bill endowment. The difference in aggregate behavior is signiﬁcant (t = 2.36, p < 0.02),
indicating that the Vietnamese participants were generally more trusting and cooperative.
Additionally, both groups signaled their disapproval of free riding at high levels given that
doing so is costly and inﬂicts no material harm on the free riders. Approximately one-third
of the Thai showed disapproval and a quarter of the Vietnamese disapproved at least once.
We were astonished by the high contribution rates and wondered if our ﬁeld protocol,
which framed the encounter as contributing to a community project, could be responsible
for such high contribution rates. To test this hypothesis, we conducted nine control sessions
using the same protocol with Middlebury College students.12 The Middlebury contribution
data in the ﬁrst ﬁve perods show the anticipated decline in contributions and the standard
end-game effect, indicating that the protocol can not explain the high contribution rates





for the high contribution rates we see in our ﬁeld communities.
5. The link between behavioral and associational social capital
Our experiment generated a panel of data from 240 individuals over 10 periods. To
account for individual heterogeneity over time, we use the random effects model. Because
contributionsareboundfrombelowbyzeroandfromaboveby10,weusethetobitestimator
for our trust/cooperation analysis. Lastly, because our social sanction variable is binary, we
use the logit estimator for our analysis of why individuals show disapproval. We build
our empirical models in two steps. In our initial regressions we included only individual
demographics, and in the second set we added our measures of associational social capital
to test for any links between behavior and the network connectedness of our participants.
Table2presentstheresultsofouranalysisofcontributionsinthetwocities.Almostallthe
demographics play a signiﬁcant role in determining contributions. In Bangkok, contrary to
mostpeople’spriorexpectations,mencontributesigniﬁcantlymorethanwomen,schooling
appears to teach people to free ride because an additional year of education reduces one’s
12 Again, we tried to balance the gender composition of our groups. We were only slightly less successful. Our































































Dependent variable is an individual’s contribution in a given round (results are random effects Tobit)
Demographics only Demographics and social capital indices
BKK HCM BKK HCM
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Male 2.13∗∗∗ 0.29 −1.36∗∗∗ 0.21 1.04∗∗∗ 0.22 −1.13∗∗∗ 0.25
Schooling −0.14∗∗ 0.07 0.15∗∗∗ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.15∗∗∗ 0.03
Age −0.02 0.05 0.39∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.07 0.05 0.19∗∗∗ 0.05
Age2 −0.0002 0.0005 −0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
Household −0.15∗∗ 0.07 0.15∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.25∗∗∗ 0.04 0.05 0.06
Residence −0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.02∗∗∗ 0.01
Coop. Scale 0.49∗ 0.28 −0.25∗∗ 0.11 0.30 0.25 0.21∗ 0.11
Own −1.22∗∗∗ 0.33 0.57 0.40
Homogeneous 1.99∗∗∗ 0.26 −0.65∗ 0.40
Participate 2.99∗∗∗ 0.35 −2.33∗∗∗ 0.48
Chat 0.08 0.14 0.79∗∗∗ 0.19
Describe −0.27 0.21 0.58∗∗∗ 0.22
Leader 0.18 0.37 1.11∗∗∗ 0.38
Obs. 1180 1180 1100 1120
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Contributions are bound from below by 0 and from above by 10.
∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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contributionby0.14coins(0.7Bhat),andtheredoesnotappeartobearelationshipbetween
age and contributions. However, in an unreported regression that restricts the effect of age
to be linear, we ﬁnd that contributions are signiﬁcantly decreasing with age (the coefﬁcient
is −0.04, p < 0.01). In addition, participants from larger families in Bangkok contribute
less, those who have lived in the slums longer contribute less, and those who score higher
on the cooperation personality scale contribute signiﬁcantly more.
Many of the signiﬁcant effects carry the opposite sign in Ho Chi Minh City. Women
contributemore,moreschoolingleadstohighercontributions,andcontributionsareconcave
in age with the empirically contribution-maximizing age at 33 years (a result similar to
Glaeser et al., 2002). Among the Vietnamese, people from larger households contribute
more, but it appears that duration in the slum reduces contributions as in Bangkok.
In the second set of regressions we add the associational variables. The addition of these
variables has little effect on many of our demographic results but does add signiﬁcantly to
our estimates. In Bangkok, men remain more cooperative and larger households and long
time residents of the slums remain less cooperative, but now the effect of education and
the cooperation scale lose signiﬁcance. Contrary to our priors, home ownership reduces
cooperation, but people who perceive their communities to be homogeneous cooperate
more (in line with the ingroup hypothesis), and those who claim to have been active in the
community also cooperate more. The other coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. These results suggest there are some links between network density and behavior in
Bangkok.
InHoChiMinhCity,asinBangkok,mostofthedemographicresultssurvivetheaddition
of omitted variables. However, we see that the cooperation personality scale reverses sign,
suggestingnowthat,asweexpect,morecooperativetypescontributemore.Consideringthe
associationalvariables,weseethat,unlikeBangkok,homeownershipincreasescooperation
but not signiﬁcantly. Interestingly, the Vietnamese react oppositely to homogeneity: people
who perceive the slum as more homogeneous contribute less. This result is odd, but might
be due to the fact that only 5% of our players say people mostly come from the same place.
It could be that in Vietnam this question is a better measure of feeling like an outsider in a
homogeneous community than feeling like an insider. Also, of note is the fact that many of
the remaining Vietnamese coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant while the Thai coefﬁcients were not.
People who claim to volunteer for community service contribute less, and those who report
chatting with their neighbors more often and describe their neighbors more like family are
signiﬁcantly more cooperative. Lastly, community leaders in Vietnam lead by example: the
coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant.
In terms of the economic signiﬁcance of these results, compared to the country average
contributions, men in Thailand give 15% more than women, but women in Vietnam give
15% more than men. A high school education yields no prosocial returns in Bangkok, but
in Ho Chi Minh City, this level of educational attainment increases contributions by 24%.
Attheaveragedurationintheslum,Thaiscontribute8%lessandtheVietnamesecontribute
6% less indicating that slum life might attenuate cooperativeness. Homeownership reduces
contributionsinBangkokby18%whileneighborhoodhomogeneityincreasescontributions
in Bangkok by 30% and reduces it in Ho Chi Minh City by 9%.
Most of our contribution results are in line with conventional wisdom, but there are two
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than women. Although the marginal effect is highly signiﬁcant, we do not put a lot of faith
inourhome-ownershipvariablebecausemanyofthepeoplewhoreportowningtheirhomes
are, in fact, squatting, which means they could never translate their ownership into ﬁnancial
capital and have little incentive to invest in their property. In fact, homeownership, as we
understanditintheWest,doesnotreallyapplytomanyoftheresidentsinourcommunities.
One could argue that since the implementation of doi moi, however, when the households
of Ho Chi Minh City have obtained the power to sell and buy property previously owned by
the state, the situation of households in poor neighborhoods has become more like that of
the private homeowners of Western Nations (Gainsborough, 2002). On the other hand, the
privatemarkethaslongﬂourishedinBangkok,leavingmanyofthepoorwithlittlechoicebut
to squat for long periods of time. This also indicates that many of the conventional reasons
for ownership to affect social capital (i.e., having a ﬁnancial stake in the community) apply
to few of our respondents.
As it turns out, Thai men have been stereotyped as notorious gamblers. With this in-
formation in mind, we thought that one explanation of behavior in Bangkok might be
that men were treating our experiment like a slot machine. After a few sessions, we
started asking people, at the end of the interview, what the game reminded them of.
We expected that if our hypothesis was true that men would disproportionately respond
with a comment having to do with gambling. We received six responses from 44 partici-
pants: being helpful (14%), a community project (32%), nothing (24%), cooperation (8%),
an investment (18%), and sports (4%). Nobody explicitly mentioned gambling, and the
distribution of responses by men is actually skewed slightly more towards the coopera-
tive descriptions, although the means (generated by ranking the responses from least to
most cooperative) are not signiﬁcantly different (t = 0.33, p = 0.74). This suggests that
gambling is not the right answer, and men appear to be sincerely more cooperative in
Thailand.
In Table 3, we report our social disapproval results. In Vietnam, none of the demograph-
ics explain social disapproval; however, one alternative explanation is highly signiﬁcant.
The regressor Var(Cont) is the group-level variance in contributions. We see that the Thais
appear immune to the variance in contributions, but the Vietnamese behave as we would
expect; when the variance increases (e.g., the group is split between free riders and con-
tributors), the Vietnamese are more likely to show disapproval. Lastly, Contribution is the
amount contributed by the individual deciding to signal disapproval or not. In other exper-
iments in which people can punish free riders, we see a strong result between contributing
and punishing (e.g., Carpenter, 2002b), but this result does not translate into our social
disapproval situation. Cooperators seem just as likely as free riders to disapprove of the
group’s behavior.
A few additional correlations emerge when we add the associational social capital vari-
ables to the Thai regression. Sanctioning remains concave in age, and now duration in the
slum predicts disapproval (the longer the duration the more likely participants are to show
disapproval), but the effect of household size diminishes. People who perceive the slum to
be more homogeneous are less likely to show disapproval, as are those who claim to have
participated in a community project. Lastly, the more one chats with her neighbors, the
less likely she is to show disapproval. These results suggest that associations dampen one’s
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Table 3
Dependent variable is one if the individual shows disapproval (results are random effects Logit)
Demographics only Demographics and social capital indices
BKK HCM BKK HCM
M.E. S.E. M.E. S.E. M.E. S.E. M.E. S.E.
Contribution −0.03 0.09 −0.03 0.09 0.07 0.09 −0.02 0.10
Var(Cont) 0.01 0.05 0.14∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.02 0.05 0.12∗∗∗ 0.05
Male 0.02 0.63 −0.02 0.47 0.35 0.58 −0.20 0.53
Schooling 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.08
Age 0.28∗∗∗ 0.10 −0.13 0.11 0.39∗∗∗ 0.15 −0.09 0.12
Age2 −0.002∗ 0.001 0.002 0.001 −0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002
Household −0.30∗∗∗ 0.11 0.02 0.09 −0.19 0.12 0.07 0.11
Residence 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.02
Coop. Scale −0.21 0.46 −0.01 0.24 −0.86 0.87 0.05 0.26
Own −0.08 0.80 1.28 1.02
Homogeneous −1.36∗∗ 0.54 0.13 1.27
Participate −3.70∗∗ 1.84 0.82 1.12
Chat −0.64∗ 0.37 1.28∗ 0.68
Describe 0.82 0.54 0.003 0.51
Leader −0.97 0.87 1.49 1.02
Obs. 472 472 440 448
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.16
Notes: Marginal effects are reported.
∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
The addition of the social capital variables has little effect on the Vietnamese estimate of
social disapproval. In fact, the regressors are jointly not different from zero. Again, most of
theestimationisdrivenbythevarianceincontributions,butthereisamarginallysigniﬁcant
effect of ties to one’s neighbors. The effect is the opposite of what we see in the Thai data.
The more contact a Vietnamese player has with her neighbors, the more likely she is to
speak out against free riding, indicating that the Vietnamese become more emboldened
when they are close to their neighbors.
6. Comparisons between the Thai and the Vietnamese
In unreported regressions we also stacked the two data sets from Tables 2 and 3, added
Thai dummy variables and generated interactions between the dummies and all our regres-
sors so that we could identify any signiﬁcant differences between the responses of our Thai
participants and their Vietnamese counterparts. In fact, there are a number of interesting
results.
In general, chi-squared tests of the joint signiﬁcance of the demographic differences
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differences in the associational social capital variables.13 More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that,
with respect to our cooperation demographics, Thai men are signiﬁcantly more cooperative
and schooling has a signiﬁcantly greater effect in Vietnam, as do age and household size.
In terms of the effects of associational social capital, Thais are affected signiﬁcantly dif-
ferently than Vietnamese when it comes to home ownership, homogeneity, participation in
community projects, and their interactions with their neighbors. Thais cooperate more in
homogeneous groups while the Vietnamese cooperate less, the Thais cooperate more when
they have participated in a community project before, and the Vietnamese cooperate less
than the Thais when they seem to have close relationships with their neighbors.
These differences are likely due to cultural and political-economic inﬂuences on local
cooperation.HomogeneityandcommunalactionamongThaiparticipantsreﬂectsthesocial
beneﬁts of strong ties among network members while similar strength of ties among Viet-
namese participants may constitute avenues by which monitoring can be effectively main-
tained. Thus, while homogeneity and neighbor closeness in the Thai context may present
opportunities for trust and cooperation, the same may not hold in the more state-controlled
Vietnamese communities.
Because the only thing that seems to inﬂuence the Vietnamese decision to show disap-
proval is the variance in group contributions, many of the demographic and social capital
estimates are signiﬁcantly different. Schooling, age, and household size all matter signiﬁ-
cantlymorefortheThaiswhodisapprovemorethemoreschoolingtheyhavehad,disapprove
more and then less as they get older, and disapprove less if they come from larger families.
These cultural differences also exist in the network variables. The Thais are signiﬁcantly
less likely to sanction the group if they claim to own their homes, come from more homo-
geneous communities, or report having participated in a community project in the last year.
However, they are signiﬁcantly more likely to disapprove if they chat more often with their
neighbors. Lastly, as we would expect given the laissez faire nature of Thai culture and
the heavy hand of the Vietnamese state, leaders in Vietnam are signiﬁcantly more likely to
signal disapproval.
7. Discussion
We contend that the hypothetical nature of many behavioral survey questions used to
measuresocialcapitalintroducesnoiseandbiasesthatlimitthecredibilityofcertainresearch
programs. As a partial solution we conduct experiments in the ﬁeld with people who live
in urban slums where collective action is particularly important to measure behavioral
social capital and to see how behavior in the context of monetary incentives varies with
demographic factors and associational survey measures of social capital. Overall, we ﬁnd
very high rates of contributions among Thai and Vietnamese participants in a voluntary
contribution game and we see that many participants are willing to socially sanction other
13 Thecontributionstatisticisχ2 =202.27forthedemographicdifferencesandχ2 =559.26forthesocialcapital
differences.Thedisapprovalstatisticsarelowerbecauseofthelesspreciseestimates(χ2 =17.37fordemographics
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participants who free ride even though these sanctions are costly to impose and inﬂict no
monetary harm on the targets.
At the individual level, we ﬁnd that trust and cooperation vary with sex, schooling, age,
household size, and years of residence in the slum, as well as placement on a psychologi-
cal cooperation scale. Additionally, we ﬁnd that behavior correlates with home ownership,
community homogeneity, past participation in community projects, the relationship be-
tween players and their neighbors, and community leadership. We also see that a person’s
willingness to show disapproval of free riding is determined by age, the variance in group
level contributions, and a number of our measures of network density. However, many of
these correlations differ signiﬁcantly between our Thai participants and our Vietnamese
participants, indicating the critical role of culture and political economic conditions.
Our experiments generate three mysteries: why do the Thai and Vietnamese contribute
at high levels, why do participants socially sanction others when this behavior is costly
and carries no punch, and why does behavior seem to differ by location? The obvious
explanation of the difference in the Thai and Vietnamese contribution rates compared to
ourMiddleburystudentcontrolsisthatThaiandVietnamesecultureismorecooperativeand
trusting. In fact there is some broad evidence of East–West differences in cooperation and
trust in the experimental literature (Hemesath and Pomponio, 1998; Buchan et al., 2000).
One study is particularly relevant: Parks and Vu (1994) compare undergraduates from the
United States to recent immigrants from Vietnam in a public goods setting and ﬁnd, as we
do, that the Vietnamese are substantially more cooperative and that the rate of cooperation
does not decline with repetition.
The second puzzle concerns why our participants tend to socially sanction the other
group members for free riding. We can think of two possible explanations. First, there is
considerable work on what has been called expressive voting, which is the idea that people
vote to voice their opinions even when they know that the probability that theirs is the
determining vote is small (e.g., Brennan and Lomasky, 1993 or Tyran, 2002). It may be the
case that our participants understand that there is no cost to the other participants when they
express their disapproval, yet they do it anyway because they feel the need to express their
moral disapproval.
An alternative, but related explanation, draws on the research described in Carpenter
and Matthews (2002) who show that people in a voluntary contribution setting will pay
to punish free riders in a completely separate group, even though the punishers can never
beneﬁt from higher contributions in the other group. The authors call this behavior social
reciprocity and deﬁne it as the act of demonstrating one’s disapproval, at some personal
cost, for the violation of a widely-held norm like not free riding. Our participants’ behavior
is consistent with social reciprocity because showing disapproval is costly and can not be
expected to yield any beneﬁts. Given the prevalence of this behavior in the experimental
lab, it is not surprising to also witness it in the ﬁeld.
Considering our last mystery, can we offer an explanation for the differences we see
between our Thai and Vietnamese participants? We think it is plausible to make sense of
many of the differences in terms of individualistic versus collectivist cultures deﬁned to
include political economy and the insitution of the state (Fukuyama, 1995; Triandis, 1995).
Vietnam best resembles a collectivist culture in which many social norms evolve and are
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usuallyconsideredoneofthemostindividualisticculturesinSoutheastAsia.Individualistic
cultures are characterized as not developing clear norms of behavior and of being more
acceptingofbehavioraldifferences.Thesedifferencesare,infact,reﬂectedinandsupported
by the governance of both countries (Gainsborough, 2002; Daniere and Takahashi, 2002).
Further, for Thais, individualism centers on the individual and household embedded in a
hierarchical social system where patrons facilitate access to resources and power for their
clients. Consequently, horizontal social relationships (e.g., relations with neighbors) for
low-income residents may provide fewer opportunities for social advancement or material
improvements than linkages to more powerful patrons (Daniere and Takahashi, 1999).
Overall, our data match this characterization perfectly. Vietnamese players contribute
signiﬁcantly more than Thai players for three reasons. First, the variance of contributions
is signiﬁcantly lower in Vietnam (p < 0.01) indicating that players there conform much
more than in Thailand. Second, the probability that a Vietnamese player shows disapproval
is much higher. We calculated, at the regressor means for each country, the estimated
probabilitythataplayerwhocontributeseverythingwhenherteammatescontributenothing
will signal disapproval. The probability is low in Thailand, 0.08, but it is almost four times
higherinVietnam,0.29.Third,regressingcontributionsonthelagofsocialsanctionsshows
that disapproval “works” in Vietnam (β = 0.79, p < 0.01) but not in Thailand (β = 0.49, p
> 0.10).
Reconsidering section 6 ﬁlls in more of the details. For example, consider the fact that
schooling makes much more of a difference in Vietnam. A simple explanation of this
fact is that culture is partially transmitted through schools (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). In
individualisticThailand,studentsarenottaughtspeciﬁcnormsofpubliccooperation,while
inVietnam,especiallyconsideringtheroleofpartyideology,prosocialnormsaredeveloped
and strongly reinforced in school (Daniere and Takahashi, 1999). Similarly, it is interesting
that leaders only make a difference among the Vietnamese. Thai leaders follow disparate
norms,butVietnameseleaderscontributetothegoodofthegroup.NoticethatinThailandthe
likelihoodofdisapprovingincreasesinageforoursample,whichwethinkisconsistentwith
the fact that in many cultures, norms are enforced by the older members of communities.
Recall, however, that age does not matter in Ho Chi Minh City because here the party
and stricter government control may substitute for elders in the enforcement of prosocial
behavior.Moreover,weseethattheonlythingthatmatterstotheVietnamesewhenitcomes
to disapproval is the variance in contributions, which is consistent with collectivist culture
and the notion of social reciprocity; if there are too many free riders breaking the norm,
they are sanctioned, regardless of the speciﬁcs of the situation. The signiﬁcance of many
more of the regressors in Thailand indicates that there are many more “types” of people
who show disapproval for different reasons.
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